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The Impact of U.S. Immigration Policy on
Mexican Unauthorized Immigration
Belinda I. Reyes t

On March 22, 2007, U.S. Representatives Luis Gutierrez (DIll.) and Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.) unveiled new legislation intended to
"fix our nation's badly broken immigration system."1 The unfinished political debate promised to be an important issue for the
110th Congress in the last two years of the Bush Administration.
But Congress approved no comprehensive plan.
Although defined by some as "the quintessential American
experience," 2 immigration continues to be a politically contentious issue. For some, the debate is about national identity and
the challenges "new" foreigners with different traditions, languages and cultures present to the "American fabric." 3 For oth4
ers, the debate is about economic progress and globalization.
The conflict between the economic demands of a globally expanding, interconnected world economy and the protectionist desires
of those concerned with vulnerable resources and cultural traditions frame the debate. Also at play are the persistent problems
t Assistant Professor, San Francisco State University. I would like to thank Pia
Orrenius, Gordon Hanson, and the Mexican Migration Project for providing me with
critical data to conduct this analysis. I also would like to thank the reviewers at the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, as well as Deborah Reed, Hans Johnson, Douglas
Massey, Bettina Nicely Johnson, and Peter Richardson for their helpful comments on
early versions of this paper.
1 Office of Rep. Jeff Flake, Press Release, Gutierrez and Flake Unveil Bipartisan
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Legislation (Mar 22, 2007), available at <http://
flake.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=61177> (last visited Apr 14,
2007).
2 William H. A. Williams, Immigration as a Pattern in American Culture, in David
Jacobson, ed, The ImmigrationReader: America in a MultidisciplinaryPerspective 19, 19
(Blackwell 1998).
3 Consider Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster (Random House 1995); Victor Davis Hanson, Mexifornia: A State of Becoming (Encounter 2003).
4 Douglas S. Massey, Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis, in
Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind, eds, The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience 34, 48 (Russell Sage 1999); Saskia Sassen,
The Mobility of Labor and Capital:A Study in InternationalInvestment and Labor Flows
(Cambridge 1988).
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of race and discrimination, 5 expanding inequalities, 6 and the restructuring of the U.S. economy. 7 But instead of addressing the
root causes of these problems, politicians often use immigrants
as scapegoats, ignoring the systemic problems, diffusing the politicians' responsibility and placing the blame on some distant foreigner. The current challenge is balancing economic realities,
social concerns, and political conflicts to create a realistic futureoriented policy.
In order to inform the debate, this paper explores the links
between U.S. immigration policy and unauthorized immigration.
We briefly review the history of U.S. immigration policy and the
academic evidence for a link between immigration and policy.
Then we present new evidence of the impact of U.S. immigration
policy-border controls, legalizations, and guest-worker programs-on unauthorized Mexican immigration. This article examines unauthorized immigration from 1970 until 1998 and explicitly models the impact of U.S. immigration policy on migration behavior. Moreover, we examine male and female migration
to explore the differential impact of policies on male and female
migrants.
I. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
In this section we will briefly review the history of U.S. immigration policy to set the stage for the current debate on immigration policy. Two general points summarize our history:
1. U.S. immigration policy is not the result of a coherent
plan or a systematic philosophy; it is the result of political
battles, economic swings, and cultural fears.
2. Arguments about the potential impact of immigrants
on U.S. society-their "inferiority" and believed lack of
ability to adapt to U.S. society-date back to the 1700s
and are still a part of the policy debate.

5 See, for example, Elijah Anderson and Douglas S. Massey, eds, Problem of the
Century: Racial Stratificationin the United States (Russell Sage 2001).
6 See, for example, James Lardner and David A. Smith, Inequality Matters: The
Growing Economic Divide in America and Its Poisonous Consequences (New Press 2007).
7 See, for example, Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, The Great U-Turn: CorporateRestructuringand the Polarizationof America (Basic Books 1988).
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Labor Needs

Since the colonial period, immigration has played a critical
part in the economic expansion of the United States. During the
colonial period, private companies and colonial governments advertised the "New World" to British and European workers, offering land, transportation, equipment, supplies, the right to vote,
8
and religious tolerance to those interested in immigrating.
Starting in the 1850s, Asian immigrants were brought to the
Southwest following the Gold Rush to facilitate railway and agricultural expansion. 9 And during the Civil War, the first federal
immigration law was primarily interested in increasingimmigration to secure enough labor to meet production needs during the
war.10
Throughout the following decades, as restrictions were imposed on immigrants from Asia," and Southern and Eastern
Europe, 12 Mexicans became the labor of choice. They were for the
most part excluded from most restrictions until 1965 because of
the need to maintain a flow of cheap labor from Mexico. Moreover, for over 20 years, a bilateral agreement between Mexico
and the United States brought millions of Mexican immigrants
to work in the United States during the Bracero Program. 13 This
agreement developed a symbiotic relationship between Mexican
labor and U.S. employers that still exists today.
But this need for labor has led to the transformation of the
U.S. population. As early as the 1700s, the immigrant flow
changed the demographics of the colonial population. By the time
of the Declaration of Independence, more than one third of the
country's white inhabitants were of non-English origin. 14 The
diversification of the immigration population continued throughout the 1800s. As shown in Figure 1, the proportion of Britishborn residents in the U.S. population declined significantly and
8 William S. Bernard, Immigration: History of U.S. Policy, in Jacobson, ed, The
Immigration Reader, 48, 49 (Blackwell 1998).
9 Roger Daniels, Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States Since
1850 at 19 (Wash 1988).
10 Kitty Calavita, U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses: The Limits of Legislation,
in Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield, eds, ControllingImmigration:A Global Perspective 55, 57 (Stanford 1994).
11 Bernard, Immigration: History of U.S. Policy at 58-59 (cited in note 8); Calavita,
U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses at 58-59 (cited in note 10).
12 Bernard, Immigration:History of U.S. Policy at 64 (cited in note 8).
13 Calavita, U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses at 59-61 (cited in note 10).

14 Bernard, Immigration:History of U.S. Policy at 52 (cited in note 8).
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by the late 1800s, the majority of the immigrants in the United
States were from other parts of the world.
B.

Backlash

But even in the early years of the republic there was resistance to immigration; as the immigrant population grew and diversified, arguments about the potential of immigrants to assimilate and their perceived "inferiority" gained strength throughout
the country. In California, fears about a subhuman Asian invasion increased pressure on politicians, leading to the passage of
the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 and restrictions on other
Asian immigrant groups in subsequent years. 15 At the turn of the
twentieth century, a large and ethnically diverse immigrant
population began to involve itself in the labor movement as political struggles were emerging in the states. Once the World
War started in Europe, it ignited fears among the U.S. born
population and brought increasing appeals for immigration controls. 16 The 1911 Dillingham Report to the President proclaimed
the potential ill effects of a growing immigrant population and
the perceived inferiority of the new immigrant groups, leading to
the passage of restrictive federal immigration policies in 1917,
1921, and 1924.17 In 1921, Congress passed the Quota Act, which
not only set a limit on immigration, but restricted annual admissions from each foreign country to three percent of the foreignborn from that country in the U.S. as of the 1910 Census, effectively restricting immigration from most parts of the world and
giving preference to Northern Europeans. i8 After the passage of
the Immigration Act of 1924, Northern and Western Europe received 82 percent of the total annual quota. 19
C.

Political pressures

Political changes in the United States and internationally
put pressure on the federal government to change its approach
toward immigrants. War World II increased the number of refu15 Daniels, Asian America at 52-56 (cited in note 9).
16 Calavita, U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses at 57-58 (cited in note 10). See
generally Claudia Goldin, The PoliticalEconomy of ImmigrationRestriction in the United
States, 1890 to 1921, Working Paper 4345 (NBER 1993) (discussing the political and
economic factors leading to the imposition of literacy requirements for immigrants).
17 Bernard, Immigration:History of U.S. Policy at 63 (cited in note 8).
18 Id.
19 Id.
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gees, many of whom the U.S. allowed to enter the country. 20 The
Cold War required the U.S. to change its policies against Asian
immigrants as it tried to project an image of itself as the defender of democracy and the leader of the "free new world"
against communism. 21 In 1943, the Magnuson Act repealed the
Chinese Exclusion Act and in 1952 the McCarran-Walter Act
loosened restrictions on Asian immigration. 22 Then the civil
rights movement in the United States brought to the surface the
ill effects of race-based policies and discrimination. 23 John F.
Kennedy attacked the national origin system in 1963, and after
his death the Hart-Celler Act of 1965 abolished the national origin quota system, ending all restrictions on Asian immigrants
and setting an annual immigration ceiling of 170,000 persons,
without preference for immigrants from any one country. 24 This
was also the first time numerical limits were imposed on the
western hemisphere, a year after the end of the Bracero Program

in 1964.25
Since the Hart-Celler Act, the number of immigrants has increased dramatically, going from 9.6 million in 1970 to 35.7 million in 2005.26 The immigrant population has become more Asian
and Latino and less European in origin. And there has been a
growing influx of unauthorized immigrants from the Western
Hemisphere, who for the first time had numerical restrictions on
their numbers. These three patterns-increasing numbers, di20 Bernard, Immigration:History of U.S. Policy at 68 (cited in note 8).
21 See Eytan Meyers, The Political Economy of InternationalImmigration Policy: A
Comparative and Quantitative Study at 105-06 (June 1995) (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, on file with U Chi Legal F).
22 Magnuson Act, Pub L No 78-199, 57 Stat 600 (1943); McCarran-Walter Act, Pub L
No 82-414, 66 Stat 163 (1952); Bernard, Immigration: History of U.S. Policy at 67, 69-70
(cited in note 8).
23 See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A
New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 NC L Rev 273, 301-02
(1996).
24 Hart-Celler Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-236, 79 Stat 911 (1965); Edward Kennedy,
The ImmigrationAct of 1965, 367 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 137, 139, 148-49 (1966).
25 Calavita, U.S. Immigrationand Policy Responses at 61-62 (cited in note 10).
26 See Campbell J. Gibson and Emily Lennon, Historical Census Statistics on the
Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850-1990, Population Bureau, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Working Paper 49 at Table 1 (U.S. Census Bureau 1999), available at
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029.html>
(last
visited Apr 14, 2007); U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2005 American Community Survey
(U.S. Census Bureau 2005), available at <http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/Dataset
MainPageServlet?program=ACS&submenuId=populationO&_lang-en&ts=> (last visited
Apr 14, 2007); Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of America's
Foreign-Born Populationin 2005 at 1 (Center for Immigration Studies September 2005),
available at <http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/backl405.pdf> (last visited Apr 14, 2007).
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versification, and illegal immigration-set the stage for increasing appeals to restrict the flow of immigrants and to do something about illegal immigration.
Concerns about the number of unauthorized immigrants in
the United States led to the first legalization program and the
largest border enforcement buildup effort in U.S. history. The
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA") increased
border enforcement and imposed sanctions on those who employ
unauthorized immigrants.2 7 Most importantly, it legalized some
2.3 million formerly undocumented Mexican immigrants. 28 Eight
years later, Attorney General Janet Reno and Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") Commissioner Doris Meissner
launched the most ambitious border enforcement effort in U.S.
history, the Southwest Border Strategy. 29 This multiyear strategy was intended to disrupt unauthorized entry via traditional
entry points along the southwest border. 30 The border enforcement budget increased over five-fold between 1980 and 2002,
31
reaching $1.8 billion.
Today, the number of unauthorized immigrants is at an alltime high and their labor has become essential in many labor
markets in the United States. 32 This has led many in the U.S.
Congress to look for a different approach. 33 Recently, $1.2 billion
27 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-603, 100 Stat 3381
(1986); Calavita, U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses at 68-69 (cited in note 10).
28 United States Immigration and Naturalization Services, 1991 Statistical Yearbook
of the Immigration and NaturalizationService 70 (USGPO 1992).
29 Belinda I. Reyes, Hans P. Johnson, and Richard Van Swearingen, Holding the
Line? The Effect of the Recent Border Build-up on UnauthorizedMigration at v (Pub Pol
Institute of CA 2002).
30 Id.

31 Gordon H. Hanson, Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance and
Political Opposition to Open Borders at 16 (Inst for Intl Econ 2005).
32 Wayne A. Cornelius, The Structural Embeddedness of Demand for Mexican Immigrant Labor: New Evidence from California,in Marcelo M. Su.rez-Orozco, ed, Crossings:
Mexican Immigration in InterdisciplinaryPerspectives 114 (Harvard 1998).
33 Before the attacks of September 11th, the United States and Mexico were contemplating a comprehensive bilateral agreement on immigration. The effort would have included collaborations on border controls, visa approval, the legalization of unauthorized
immigrants, and legal avenues for immigration. But since September lth,
the debate
has shifted to border controls and visa checks. In January 2004, President Bush proposed,
and since has continued to advocate for, a new guest worker program that would include
the close to 10.5 million unauthorized immigrants currently living in the United States.
During the summer of 2006, the Senate agreed on a comprehensive immigration package
that included guest worker programs, legalizations, and border controls. The agreement
stalled in the House of Representatives. In March 2007, U.S. Representatives Gutierrez
and Flakes proposed a new comprehensive bill. Although there are intense negotiations
taking place behind close doors, it is uncertain whether a bill would be signed before the
2008 election. See generally Nicole Gaouette, Immigration Plan Quietly in the Works: The
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were approved for border controls and the President signed a bill
to build a 700-mile fence along the U.S.-Mexico border.34 No
budget has yet been allocated for its construction, but the Congressional Research Service estimated that the fence could cost
35
as much as $49 billion.
Even though border control has been the main approach to
controlling illegal immigration and large sums of money are being spent protecting the border, it remains unclear if it is achieving its intended goal: to deter and reduce illegal immigration.
The consequences of other policy alternatives on illegal immigration, namely, guest worker programs and legalizations, remain
unclear as well. These are the issues explored in this paper.
II. EVIDENCE OF AN IMPACT
In this section we review the social science literature for evidence of the impact of U.S. immigration policy on undocumented
immigration. First we review studies on the impact of changes in
the number of legal permanent residents (LPRs), such as with
legalization, and increases in the number of non-immigrant visas, such as guest worker programs, on unauthorized immigration. This is followed by a review of the literature examining the
relationship between border controls and undocumented immigration.
A.

Legal Admission and Guest Worker Programs

There is no clear evidence of the impact of increases in the
number of legal permanent residents, or legalizations, on unauthorized immigration. Looking at data in the U.S. before and after IRCA, Johnson and Warren find large increases in the number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States following
the IRCA's legalization. 36 But other studies suggest there may
White House Has Been Meeting with GOP Senators to Devise a Bill Aimed at Garnering
Wide Republican Support, LA Times A10 (Mar 29, 2007); Office of Rep. Jeff Flake, Press
Release, Gutierrez and Flake Unveil Bipartisan Comprehensive Immigration Reform
Legislation (cited in note 1).
34 See Reuters, Bush Signs Bill Paying For Border Fence: $1.2 Billion Part of $33.8
Billion Domestic Security Package (MSNBC Oct 4, 2006), available at <http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15131303/> (last visited Apr 14, 2007); Michael A. Fletcher and
Jonathan Weisman, Bush Signs Bill Authorizing 700-Mile Fence for Border, Wash Post
A4 (Oct 27, 2006).
35 Blas Nufiez-Neto and Steven Vifia, Border Security: BarriersAlong the U.S. International Border at 25 (Cong Rsrch Serv 2006).
36 Hans P. Johnson, Undocumented Immigration to California:1980-1993 at 99 (Pub
Pol Inst of Cal 1996); Robert Warren, Annual Estimates of the UnauthorizedPopulation
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have been only a short-term decline in unauthorized immigration.37 Orrenius and Zavodny find a decline in apprehensions
immediately after the passage of IRCA and the effect weakening
over time. 38 On the other hand, Hanson and Spilimbergo find no
correlation between the lagged log of legal admissions of Mexican
immigrants and apprehensions. 39 Finally, using sending community samples, other studies have found a limited impact of the
legalization on unauthorized immigration from Mexico. 40 In the
short run, it appears that unauthorized immigration may have
declined, as immigrants were legalized, but as new immigrants
entered the flow, unauthorized immigration returned to prelegalization levels.
As for the probability of immigrants returning to their home
countries, only two studies have examined the impact of the
IRCA legalization on return probabilities or duration of stay in
the United States. 41 Massey and Espinosa argue that the legalization increased duration of stay in the United States. 42 But
Residing in the United States and Components of Changes: 1987 to 1997 (USINS 2000).
37 Thomas J. Espenshade, Undocumented Migration to the United States: Evidence
from a Repeated Trials Model, in Frank D. Bean, Barry Edmonston, and Jeffrey S. Passel,
eds, Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s
159, 174-78 (RAND and Urban Inst 1990); Michael J. White, Frank D. Bean, and Thomas
J. Espenshade, The U.S. 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and Undocumented
Migration to the United States, 9 Pop Rsrch & Pol Rev 93, 103-04, 113 (1990).
38 Pia M. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny, Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented Immigration?Evidence from IRCA, 40 Demography 437, 448 (2003).
39 Gordon H. Hanson and Antonio Spilimbergo, Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 89
Am Econ Rev 1337, 1352 (1999).
40 See Wayne A. Cornelius, Impacts of the 1986 US Immigration Law on Emigration
from Rural Mexican Sending Communities, 15 Pop & Dev Rev 689, 697 (1989); Katherine
M. Donato, Jorge Durand, and Douglas S. Massey, Stemming the Tide? Assessing the
Deterrent Effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 29 Demography 139, 139
(1992); Mercedes Gonzilez de la Rocha and Agustin Escobar Latapi, The Impact of IRCA
on the MigrationPatternsof a Community in Los Altos, Jalisco, Mexico, in Unauthorized
Migration: Addressing the Root Causes: Research Addendum, 1987-1990, Supplement
131, 140 (Comm for Study of Intl Migration & Coop Econ Dev 1990); Karen A. Woodrow
and Jeffrey S. Passel, Post-IRCA Undocumented Immigration to the United States: An
Assessment Based on the June 1988 CPS, in Bean, Edmonston, and Passel, eds, Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s 33, 59
(RAND and Urban Institute 1990) (cited in note 37).
41 See Douglas S. Massey and Kristin E. Espinosa, What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration?A Theoretical, Empirical and Policy Analysis, 102 Am J of Sociology 939, 973-74,
979-80 (1997); Donato, Durand, and Massey, 29 Demography at 144-53 (cited in note 40).
See also Belinda Reyes, Changes in Trip Durationfor Mexican Immigrants to the United
States, 23 Pop Rrsch & Pol Rev 235, 235 (2004).
42 Massey and Espinosa, 102 Am J of Sociology at 979-80 (cited in note 41). Massey
and Espinosa did not use the actual number of legal visas granted to Mexicans. Instead
they used an estimate of the available visas by creating a ratio of annual legal Mexican
immigrants to the sum of legal immigrants plus an estimate of gross unauthorized en-
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Reyes finds that the legalization may have initially increased the
probability of a return to Mexico. What may have decrease return probabilities is a legalization inmediatelly followed by an
increase in border controls.
There is a limited literature on the links between guest
worker programs and undocumented immigration in the United
States. An important article by Massey and Liang finds that
guest worker programs increase the number of people in the migration flow by increasing the number of trips made by guest
workers and their family members. But the programs decrease
43
the probability of long-term settlement in the United States.
They argue that, "by encouraging and facilitating return migration [temporary worker programs] may effectively lower the
44
rates of settlement among seasonal migrants."
B.

Border Controls and Unauthorized Immigration

A number of studies have examined the impact of border
controls on unauthorized immigration. Donato, et al, find no statistically significant changes in first migration, remigration, or
on the probability of apprehension with increases in enforcement
before and after IRCA. 45 On the other hand, Massey and
Espinosa find a positive correlation between border controls and
the probability of a first-time unauthorized immigration, as prospective migrants fear further enforcement and attempt to cross
while they still can. 46 These results are corroborated by Reyes,
Johnson, and Swearingen, who find an increase not only in first
immigration, but also in repeat migration, with further increases
47
in enforcement.
Looking at the effect of apprehensions on repeat migration
and duration of stay in the United States, Kossoudji finds that
migrants who have been apprehended make additional trips to
tries. Id at 949. This measure is problematic for two reasons: (1) it relies on an estimate of
the gross unauthorized entries, which may be unreliable; and (2) by this definition of visa
availability, the number of available visas could go down even if the number of legal visas
is increasing. For example, if both legal visas and unauthorized immigration goes up, but
unauthorized entries grow by more than-legal visas, the number of visas available would
decline.
43 Douglas S. Massey and Zai Liang, The Long-Term Consequences of a Temporary
Worker Program- The US Bracero Experience, 8 Pop Rsrch & Pol Rev 199, 199 (1989).
44 Id at 220.
45 See Donato, Durand, and Massey, 29 Demography at 144-53 (cited in note 40).
46 Massey and Espinosa, 102 Am J Soc at 963 (cited in note 41).
47 Reyes, Johnson, and Van Swearingen, Holding the Line? at 10, 14 (cited in note
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the United States more quickly than those not apprehended and
spend less time in Mexico. 48 Once in the United States, if not apprehended again, unauthorized immigrants stay longer in the
United States than those not apprehended a first time. 49 Furthermore, Massey, Durand and Malone,5 0 and Reyes, Johnson,
and Swearingen 5' find a decline in the probability of return to
Mexico for unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. in the mid- to
late 1990s. Massey, Durand and Malone argue, "U.S. immigration and border policies after 1990 transformed what had been a
circular flow of temporary migrants into a settled immigration of
'52
permanent residents.
Gathmann, 53 as well as Hanson, Roberton and Spilimbergo, 54 have examined the impact of border controls on the cost
of migration and the wages received by immigrants. They find a
limited impact of border control on the cost of hiring a smuggler,
migration outflows, and wages in the United States, suggesting
border controls had a limited impact on unauthorized immigration.
Other studies have observed the effect of some of the strategies that were part of the Southwest Border Strategy: Operation
Hold the Line in Texas and Operation Gatekeeper in San
Diego. 55 For instance, an early evaluation of Operation Hold the
Line found that the policy was effective at reducing the crossing
of certain "local" unauthorized crossers--domestic service work48 Sherrie A. Kossoudji, Playing Cat and Mouse at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 29 Demography 159, 170 (1992).
49 Id at 169-70.
50 Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration at 131 (Russell Sage 2002).
51 Reyes, Johnson, and Van Swearingen, Holding the Line? at 26 (cited in note 29).
52 Massey, Durand, and Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors at 131 (cited in note 50).
53 Christina Gathmann, The Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets: Evidence from
Migrant Smuggling Along the Southwestern Border, Working Paper 1004 (IZA 2004),
available at <http://www.iza.org/> (last visited Apr 14, 2007).
54 Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond Robertson, and Antonio Spilimbergo, Does Border
Enforcement Protect U.S. Workers from Illegal Immigration?, 84 Rev Econ & Stat 73
(2002).
55 Since 1994 the then Immigration and Naturalization Services launched the most
ambitious border enforcement effort in U.S. history, which came to be known as the
Southwest Border Strategy. The multi-year strategy includes expanded use of technology,
manpower, and resources along the major crossings places of immigrants at the U.S.Mexico border. It started in El Paso, Texas and in subsequent years resources have been
expanded through the 2000 mile border. Today over 10,000 agents guard the United
States-Mexico border and resources are augmented every year. See Office of the President, Press Release, President Bush Discussion Comprehensive Immigration Reform in
Yuma, Arizona (Apr 9, 2007), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2007/04/print/20070409-12.html> (last visited Apr 15, 2007).
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ers and street vendors who live in Ciudad Juarez and cross daily
to work in El Paso-but that it had no deterrent effect on longdistance crossers. 56 Cornelius 57 has looked at Operation Gatekeeper and he suggests that although unauthorized crossers are
being forced to cross in other areas, the program may not have
had a real impact on overall flow. 58 However, no formal test is
presented in either paper.
The Government Accountability Office ("GAO") also conducted a number of evaluations of the Southwest Border Strategy and found that some of the intended goals of the policy have
been achieved. 59 The GAO has found that crossing locations have
changed from traditional high-volume entry points like San
Diego and El Paso to other locations along the border, more migrants appear to be using fraudulent documents, and the price
charged by smugglers has gone up, indicating an increase in the
difficulty in crossing.6 0 However, the reports do not evaluate the
deterrent effect of the border build-up or its effect on duration of
stay, and they make clear that an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of the policy is essential in order to determine if the billions of dollars invested in the strategy are producing the in61
tended results.
This study goes beyond previous work in several ways. It incorporates data obtained after the implementation of the Southwest Border Strategy. It also looks at the effects of border enforcement and at increases in the number of immigrant or non56 Frank D. Bean, et al, Illegal Mexican Migration & the United States/Mexico Border: The Effects of OperationHold the Line on El Paso/Judrezat 17-26, 37 (Texas 1994).
57 Wayne A. Cornelius, Appearances and Realities: ControllingIllegal Immigration in
the United States, in Myron Weiner and Tadashi Hanami, eds, Temporary Workers or
Future Citizens? Japanese and U.S. Migration Policies 384, 385-95 (NYU 1997); Wayne
A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy, 27 Pop & Dev Rev 661, 667 (2002).
58 Cornelius, Appearances and Realities at 390 (cited in note 57).
59 General Accounting Office, Border Patrol: Southwest Border Enforcement Affected
by Mission Expansion and Budget GAO/GGD-91-72BR (GAO 1991); General Accounting
Office, Immigration Enforcement: Problems in Controlling the Flow of Illegal Aliens
GAOIT-GGD-93-39 (GAO 1993); General Accounting Office, Border Control: Revised
Strategy Is Showing Some Positive Results GAO/GGD-95-30 (GAO 1994); General Accounting Office, Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive;
More Evaluation Needed GAO/GGD-98-21 (GAO 1997); General Accounting Office, Illegal
Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation GAO/GGD-99-44
(GAO 1999).
60 GAO, Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation at
20-23 (cited in note 59).
61 GAO, Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More
EvaluationNeeded at 4-5 (cited in note 59); GAO, Illegal Immigration:Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation at 26-28 (cited in note 59).
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immigrant visas on migration behavior, employing a more reliable method for modeling the migration probabilities than prior
work. This paper incorporates border controls, non-immigrant
visas, legal admissions, and economic conditions in Mexico and
the United States into the model to evaluate the effect of each
factor on migration probabilities. However, because including
aggregate variables in the model would lead to a downward bias
in the error terms, which could erroneously lead to finding statistical significance for the aggregate variables, 62 we use discretetime hazard equations and cluster-sample methods to model the
probability of first and return migration. Furthermore, we look
at gender differences in migration behavior to determine if U.S.
63
immigration policy has a differential effect by gender.
III. DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
This study uses data from the Mexican Migration Project
("MVIMP") in order to capture personal, household and community
characteristics while modeling the effect of immigration policy on
migration behavior. 64 The MMP is a representative sample of 93
communities throughout Mexico and contains data gathered
since 1982 from surveys administered every year in Mexico and
the United States. Figure 2 shows a map of the states included in
the AM P. For this study we used the sample collected as of 2000,
which includes 71 communities in these states.
The MMP gathered demographic and socioeconomic information about all household members and their communities of
origin. 65 For those with migration experience, the interviewer
66
recorded information about the first and most recent U.S. trips.
Over 12,000 households were interviewed, resulting in a sample
62 For a description of the problem see Brent R. Moulton, Random Group Effects and
the Precisionof Regression Estimates, 32 J of Econometrics 385 (1986).
63 In addition, we weighed every observation by 1/sqr(n), where n is the number of
observations available for each year to correct for heteroschedasticity. The later years are
more imprecise because of a smaller sample size, so this weighting should correct for the
variance in the standard errors.
64 For a description of the MMP data see Douglas S. Massey and Emilio Parrado,
Migradollar:The Remittances and Savings of Mexican Migrants to the USA, 13 Pop Rsrch
& Pol Rev 3, 6-9 (1994); David P. Lindstrom and Douglas S. Massey, Selective Emigration, Cohort Quality, and Models of Immigrant Assimilation, 23 Soc Sci Rsrch 315, 31524 (1994); and Douglas S. Massey and Audrey Singer, New Estimates of Undocumented
Mexican Migration and the Probability of Apprehension, 32 Demography 203, 204-06
(May 1995).
65 See Mexican Migration Project, Study Design, available at <http://mmp.opr.
princeton.edu/research/design-en.aspx> (last visited Apr 14, 2007).
66 Id.
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of 15,645 people who had lived in the United States at some
67
point in their lives.
We also used a set of nationally and internationally recognized data sources to generate the macro-level variables. The
number of Mexican non-immigrants admitted and legal permanent residents were generated from the Yearbook of Immigration
Statistics for the years between 1968 and 2000.68 Enforcement
data, obtained by Gordon Hanson and provided to us from unpublished INS records, show the total person-hours that the U.S.
Border Patrol spends policing the U.S. border. 69 The unemployment rate was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Data on the exchange rate and Mexican GDP per capita were
obtained from World Bank's World Development Indicators Database.7 0 The GDP is corrected for inflation and it is measured in
1998 dollars.
We ran two models: one for the probability of making a first
unauthorized migration to the United States, and the other for
the probability of returning to Mexico once the person has entered the United States illegally. The sample is retrospective and
we look at all persons in the sample older than fifteen. 71 We then
constructed a record for every year between sixteen and thirtyfive years old.7 2 Both models capture the probability of a trip at a
particular year.7 3 This generates a sample of 616,279 "person
years" that we use for the analysis. For the return migration
model, we construct a record for every year the person was in the
United States during a particular trip and until she returned to
Mexico or turned thirty-five years old. This generates a sample of
61,839 "person years" that we use to model return migration.
We relate migration probabilities to personal, household,
community characteristics, household and community migration
67

Id.

68 Formerly the yearbook was published by the U.S. Immigrant and Naturalization

Services, but since early 2000, the yearbooks have been published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration Statistics, Washington, D.C..
69 For further details on the enforcement data see Hanson and Spilimbergo, 89 Am
Econ Rev at 1355-56 (cited in note 39).
70 World Bank, World Development Indicators (World Bank 2000).
71 Some studies have restricted the analysis to household heads, since the MMP has
more migration information on household heads. We chose all persons to take into account the differential migration patterns of all household members.
72 Although this means that every record is not going to be independent of the others,
this is standard practice in the literature.
73 We have information on the first and last trip for every member of the household.
The second model examines return probabilities at each trip, while controlling for number
of trips.
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networks, aggregate changes in the U.S. and the Mexican
economies, and changes in border controls, the number of LPRs,
or the number of non-immigrant visas. We model the probability
that person i will make a first unauthorized trip to the United
States at time period t, or the probability than once person i entered the U.S. illegally, she would return to Mexico at time pe75
riod t. 74 We use logit regressions to estimate the models.
The critical variables for our analysis are the number of
Mexicans admitted to the U.S. at year t with legal permanent
status, the number of Mexican non-immigrants admitted to the
U.S. at that same year, and the number of of hours spent guard76
ing the U.S.-Mexico border by border patrol agents at t.
IV. FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY

On average, two percent of adult males and one percent of
adult females in this sample made an unauthorized trip to the
United States on an average year between 1970 and 1998, while
seventeen percent of males and ten percent of females in the
United States returned to Mexico within the first year after migration. However, migration and return probabilities change sig74 Migration in this context is not necessarily a permanent move, as some people may
be engaging in cyclical migration. Also, short-term trips are not counted as moves by the
MMP, so this only includes trips longer than a month.
75 We also corrected for hetroschedasticity as discussed above.
76 We also control for the economic conditions in Mexico and the United States. We
look at the GDP per capita at year t, the exchange rate between pesos and dollars, and
the unemployment rate in the United States to capture changes in the U.S. and the Mexican economies. We use square terms for GDP per capita, LPRs, non-immigrant visas, and
border controls because they better capture the interaction between these variables and
migration probabilities. These variables appear to have a non-linear correlation with
migration probabilities and only using continuous variables or simple growth measures
would obscure this correlation. Furthermore, the literature suggests a non-linearity. For
example, Wayne A. Cornelius, Labor Migration to the United States: Development Outcomes and Alternatives in Mexican Sending Communities, in Sergio Diaz-Briquets and
Sidney Weintraub, eds, Regional and Sectoral Development in Mexico as Alternatives to
Migration 89, 109 (Westview 1991); Cornelius, Appearances and Realities at 384 (cited in
note 57); Philip L. Martin, Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture (Inst for Intl
Econ 1993); and Philip L. Martin, Trade and Migration: the Mexico-US Case, in Slobodan
Djaji, ed, International Migration: Trends, Policies, and Economic Impact 89, 105
(Routledge 2001), argue that as the GDP increases, inequality and displacement in agriculture increase and this could lead to a short-term increases in immigration, but as GDP
continues to increase, immigration should decrease over time. We also tried lags for many
of the variables in the analysis but they were not statistically significant. This could be
explained by the extensive networks available to potential Mexican immigrants in the
United States that make immigrants very responsive to macro changes in Mexico and the
United States. For instance, Hanson and Spilimbergo, 89 Am Econ Rev at 1352 (cited in
note 39), found no correlations between lagged log legal admissions of Mexicans on apprehensions, suggesting that adjustments are immediate.
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nificantly in the period under study. We examine the factors contributing to this change in a set of models. Table 1 presents the
probability of making a first unauthorized immigration to the
United States and Table 2 shows the probability of return to
Mexico once someone entered the U.S. illegally. Although personal, household and community characteristics were incorporated in the analysis, we only show the impact of macro economic
changes in Mexico and the U.S. and U.S. immigration policy on
these table. The results of the entire model could be made available upon request.
A.

The Probability of a First Unauthorized Immigration

Increasing the number of legal permanent residents (LPRs)
has a small and-for the most part insignificant-effect on unauthorized immigration. 77 Although the number of LPRs has no
direct effect on the probability of migration, it may have an indirect effect, with legal residents broadening the social networks
for potential migrants to the United States. Meanwhile, increasing the number of non-immigrant visas has a negative and significant effect on unauthorized immigration by females. Temporary non-immigrant visas may be a substitute for unauthorized
immigration for women. 78 Also, guest workers programs may
provide a stable source of income for families without requiring
79
them to resettle permanently in the United States.
On the other hand, border controls have a positive and significant effect on the probability of migration. However, as those
controls continue to increase, they may lead to decreases in unauthorized immigration in the long run. For the period under
analysis, the number of line-watch hours had not reached a level
at which male unauthorized immigration would decline. And it is
unclear what level of enforcement could lead to declines in male
undocumented immigration and what the costs of achieving such
a decline would be. But for females, enforcement may have already led to a decline in the probability of migration.

77 Hanson and Spilimbergo, 89 Am Econ Rev at 1352 (cited in note 39), also found no
correlation using the lag of legal permanent residents.
78 Massey and Espinosa also argue that immigrants move legally if visas are available and illegally if visas are not available. See Massey and Espinosa, 102 Am J Soc at
963 (cited in note 41).
79 Massey and Liang found a decrease in the probability of a long-term settlement for
guest workers. See Massey and Liang, 8 Pop Rsrch & Pol Rev at 220 (cited in note 43).
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Theory would suggest that increasing the cost of migration
should lead to a decline in the probability of migration, but initially we see increases in migration as a result of increases in
80
enforcement, especially for males. Hanson and Spilimbergo
found a positive correlation between enforcement and apprehensions, and they argue that this suggests that there are increasing
returns to scale on border controls. Massey and Espinosa also
found a positive correlation, and they argue that the increase is
due to fears on the part of potential migrants that an increase
would lead to further increases in enforcement, encouraging
them to cross while they still can. Finally, Gathmann argues that
the limited impact of border controls may be a result of enforcement concentrated in particular areas of the border.8 ' As a result, migrants may have shifted from higher-enforcement places
to lower-enforcement places.8 2 However, the United States has
undertaken a massive increase in personnel and resources at the
Southwest border and the impact was negligible at the time of
this analysis. More data are needed to determine if this pattern
persists over time or if border controls do eventually lead to a
decline in the probability of migration.
As suggested by our findings, economic factors also play a
critical part in the decision to migrate. People are very respon83
sive to economic conditions in Mexico and the United States.
They are less likely to move to the United States when the U.S.
unemployment rate is increasing. An increasing GDP in Mexico
originally leads to increases in migration, but as the GDP continues to increase, fewer Mexicans move to the United States.
This finding may be explained by increases in inequality and
displacement that took place in Mexico as the economy developed. Some scholars suggest that even though the Mexican economy grew in this period, there was nonetheless tremendous inequality and displacement in agriculture, which could have led
many to immigrate to the United States.8 4 Another indication of
the effect of worsening economic opportunities in Mexico on mi80 Hanson and Spilimbergo, 89 Am Econ Rev at 1350-51 (cited in note 39).
81 Gathmann, The Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets at 4-5 (cited in note 53).
82 See also Reyes, Johnson, and Van Swearingen, Holding the Line? at 57 (cited in

note 29).
83 See Hanson and Spilimbergo, 89 Am Econ Rev at 1352 (cited in note 39).
84 Cornelius, Labor Migration at 99-100 (cited in note 76); Cornelius, Appearances
and Realities at 414-15 (cited in note 57); Martin, Trade and Migration:NAFTA at 97-99
(cited in note 76); Martin, Trade and Migration: the Mexico- US Case at 101 (cited in note
76).
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gration probabilities is the effect of the exchange rate; a deterioration of the peso relative to the dollar leads to increases in unauthorized immigration.
B.

The Probability of Return for Unauthorized Mexican
Immigrants

An increase in the number of legal immigrants in the United
States, particularly increases in the number of non-immigrants,
decreases the likelihood that unauthorized immigrants will return. But for males, the probability of returning to Mexico once
they have illegally entered the United States increases as the
number of non-immigrants increases. This could be a result of
declining wages in the face of more non-immigrants in the
United States competing with unauthorized immigrants in the
same labor market. This competition would limit opportunities
for unauthorized immigrants and force them to return to Mexico.8 5 However, further increases in non-immigrant visas could
also be reinforcing cyclical migration by facilitating return migration and reducing the need to resettle, as suggested by
Massey and Liang.
Increases in the number of agents guarding the U.S.-Mexico
border decrease the probability that males return. The increase
in difficulty and rising cost of migration at the U.S.-Mexico border may have altered migration patterns for Mexican males.
Perhaps because of fear of not being able to reenter or a need to
recover high migration costs, unauthorized Mexican males are
staying longer in the United States partly due to increased enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border.
Finally, in our models the exchange rate is the only economic
variable that consistently affects the probability of return of
males and females. This underscores the temporary nature of
Mexican unauthorized immigration. Unauthorized Mexican immigrants may be more likely to leave Mexico when the peso loses
value relative to the dollar, but they are encouraged to return by
the higher value of the dollar. If immigrants are able to buy more
with their U.S. earnings in Mexico, they return more quickly to
their home communities.

85 Alberto Ddvila, Jos6 A. Pagdn, and Gokqe Soydemir, The Short-term and LongTerm Deterrence Effects of INS Border and Interior Enforcement on Undocumented Immigration, 49 J Econ Behavior & Organ 459, 466-67 (2001).
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The Impact on the Numbers

What has been the effect of all these changes on the number
of illegal immigrants in the United States and unauthorized immigrant flows, especially in the late 1990s? Some authors propose that there was a dramatic increase in unauthorized immigration in the mid-1990s. 8 6 Using the parameter estimates from
the models, the means of the independent variables, we generate
a simulation of the potential effect of changes in the macro conditions on the number of immigrants and returnees. The only variables we vary are the macro conditions, and we use their values
in 1985 and 1997 to generate the results in Figure 3.
The economic conditions in Mexico and the United States
and the changes in U.S. immigration policy in 1985 and 1997
would have doubled the number of immigrants entering the
United States in the late 1990s. Assuming there are 16 million
potential migrants in the western part of Mexico (half of them
males), the models predict that about 239,000 Mexicans would
have entered the United States without papers in 1985. But
given macro conditions and policy in the late 1990s, 556,000
would have entered the country in 1997. Of those who moved,
212,000 would have stayed in the United States for longer than a
year in 1985. But in 1997, over 486,000 would have stayed in the
United States for longer than a year. What this indicates is that,
in spite of the tremendous build-up at the U.S.-Mexico border,
the stock of unauthorized immigrants in the United States increased dramatically in the late 1990s, as the number of immigrant entering the country increased and many more stayed
longer in the United States. Nevertheless, there was a significant
decline in female unauthorized immigration, from close to 64,000
in 1985 to about 14,000 in 1997. These findings are consistent
with prior studies that find a decline in female migration but
increases in the stock of unauthorized immigrants in the United

States in the late 1990s. 8 7
86 See, for example, Frank D. Bean, Jennifer Van Hook, and Karen Woodrow-Lafield,
Estimates of Numbers of UnauthorizedMigrants Residing In the United States: The Total,
Mexican, and Non-Mexican Central American UnauthorizedPopulationsin Mid-2001 at 2
(Pew Hispanic 2002).
87 See, for example, Enrico A. Marcelli and Wayne A. Cornelius, The Changing Profile of Mexican Migrants to the United States: New Evidence from California and Mexico,
36 Latin Am Rsrch Rev 105, 110-14 (2001). For a discussion of gender patterns among
Mexican immigrants see, Jorge Durand, Douglas S. Massey, and Ren6 M. Zenteno, Mexican Immigration to the United States: Continuitiesand Changes, 36 Latin Am Rsrch Rev
107, 118-24 (2001). For a discussion of increases in the numbers of unauthorized immi-
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This paper explores the effect of economic conditions, border
controls, and changes in legal admissions on the probability of
migration and the probability of return for Mexican male and
female immigrants. Throughout the paper it is clear that macroeconomic conditions and policy changes have a significant effect
on Mexican immigration patterns. Moreover, there are important
differences between males and females that are often ignored in
the literature because most studies concentrate on the migration
of male household heads.8 8 We find that females appear to be
more responsive to changes in immigration policy than Mexican
males, with stronger responses to changes in non-immigrant visas and increases in border controls.
The two most important macroeconomic factors in this
analysis are the number of non-immigrant visas issued and the
number of agents guarding the U.S.-Mexico border. These represent two very different approaches to unauthorized immigration.
The first approach recognizes the need for immigrant labor in the
U.S. labor markets and proposes increases in the number of nonimmigrant visas as an alternative to unauthorized immigration.
The latter approach-increasing the number of agents guarding
the U.S.-Mexico border-is a response to protectionist arguments, concerns about the fiscal costs of unauthorized immigrants, and fears of displacement in the labor market. This paper
shows that both of these policies have unanticipated consequences on immigration. While decreasing female unauthorized
immigration, border controls may have a short-term positive effect on male unauthorized immigrations and may decrease the
probability of return for males and females. Even if border controls eventually lead to some decline in male unauthorized immigration, those who would continue to enter would settle permanently in the United States. After a number of years the number
of unauthorized immigrants could increase dramatically, thereby
creating a permanent unauthorized population in the United
States. We saw some indication of that in the late 1990s, as
shown in Figure 3.89
grants see Bean, Van Hook, and Woodrow-Lafield, Estimates of Numbers of Unauthorized
Migrants Residing in the United States (cited in note 86).
88 This is one of the few studies in the literature that actually includes female in the
analysis. All other studies, with some minor exceptions, concentrate on male migration.
89 Passel and others have documented an increase in undocumented immigrants in
the late 1990s and in the early 2000. See, for example, Jeffrey S. Passel, Estimates of the
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Although an increase in the number of non-immigrant visas
has no statistically significant effect on male migration, it has a
negative and significant effect on female migration. Females are
either discouraged from migrating without papers to the United
States by temporary employment contracts or are relying on nonimmigrant visas rather than unauthorized immigration. Furthermore, non-immigrant visas decrease the probability of return
in the short-run, but over time non-immigrant visas may increase return migration, reinforcing cyclical patterns of migration and encouraging a temporary pattern of migration.
The overall effect of increasing the number of non-immigrant
visas on the number of unauthorized immigrants in the United
States depends on the extent of the decline in female migration,
the increase in duration of stay in the United States, and
whether or not return migration begins to increase for males as
non-immigrant visas increase. If female immigration declines
significantly and males engage in more temporary migration,
increases in the number of non-immigrant visas could lead to a
decline in the number of unauthorized immigrants in the United
States.
This paper finds that neither policy can actually stem the
flow of unauthorized immigrants. Given the magnitude of the
networks available to Mexican migrants in the United States
and the need for immigrant labor in the United States, it is hard
to imagine a strategy that would be able to overcome the information and resources available to Mexican immigrants. If we
then think about regulating the flow of undocumented immigrants and bringing a temporary pool of workers for particular
industries, guest workers programs may be a more reliable approach than border controls. However, a guest worker program
that allows for the readjustment of status is necessary to accommodate the small proportion of workers that become long-term
productive residents. We found that legalizations have no direct
impact on the probability of moving illegally to the United
States, maybe because it is a one time readjustment to accommodate a long-term undocumented population. But legalizations
followed by increases in enforcement and no expansion of LPRs
or non-immigrant visas, as seen in the 1990s, may increase undocumented immigration and reversed a long-standing pattern of
temporary migration into a long-term settlement of a large proportion of Mexican immigrants.
Size and Characteristicsof the Undocumented Population 1-2 (Pew Hispanic 2005).
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Finally, economic conditions in Mexico and the U.S. are critical. Therefore, addressing the economic realities of Mexican immigration may be the best approach to control unauthorized immigration. Improving opportunities for Mexicans at home and
addressing increasing inequality and poverty in Mexico may be
the only reliable and long-lasting solution to unauthorized immigration.
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Table 1
Discrete-Time Hazard Model of the Probabilityof First Migration
Males

Females

Model 1
Mx GDP per capita
GDPsq
Exchange rate
US Unemp
Mx Totaladmitted
MxTotal_ adm2
Mx Non-imm
MxNon-imm2
Mx LPRs
Mx LPRs2
Line watch hrs
Line watch2
Log Likelihood
Number of obs.
Pseudo R square

Coef.
0.04**
0.00**
-0.02
-0.1**
0.27
-0.06

0.55**
-0.1**

Model 2
Std
Err
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.02
0.23
0.06

0.16
0.02

-26,307.2
227,250
0.072

Model 1

Coef.
0.04**
0.00**
0.00
-0.1**

Std
Err
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.02

0.02
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.62**
-0.1**

0.21
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.16
0.02

-26,304.7
227,750
0.0721

Coef.
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.1*
-0.57
0.25

0.94**
-0.2**

Model 2
Std
Err
0.02
0.00
0.05
0.03
0.46
0.15

0.24
0.05

-9,919.6
288,788
0.1053

Coef.
0.01
0.00
0.09*
-0.1"*

Std
Err
0.02
0.00
0.05
0.02

-1.8*
0.72**
0.00*
0.00*
1.2**
-0.3**

0.35
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.24
0.04

-9,910.2
288,788
0.1061

Note: The macro variables were normalized. Line watch hours are normalized at 1 million
hours, LPRs at 100,000 people, non-immigrant visas at 1 million people, and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at 100 pesos per person.
* is significant at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level, and *** at a 1%level.

Table 2
Discrete-Time Hazard Model of the Probabilityof Return
Males

Females

Model 1

Model 2
Std

Model 1
Std

Model 2
Std

Std

Coef.

Err

Coef.

Err

Coef.

Err

Coef.

Err

Mx GDP per capita
GDPsq
Exchange rate
US Unemp
Mx Total admitted
Mx_Totaladm2
Mx Non-imm
Mx_Non-imm2
Mx LPRs
Mx LPRs2
Line watch hrs
Line watch2

0.03
0.00
0.21**
-0.05
-1.3**
0.39**

0.02
0.00
0.04
0.04
0.44
0.13

0.03
0.00
0.25**
-0.06

0.02
0.00
0.06
0.04

0.07**
0.00
0.11
-0.10
-1.32*
0.37*

0.03
0.00
0.07
0.06
0.59
0.17

0.05
0.00
0.15*
-0.06

0.03
0.00
0.08
0.07

-1.8**
0.60**
0.00
0.00
0.45
-0.2**

0.65
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.29
0.06

-1.92*
0.58
0.00
0.00
0.11
-0.08

0.92
0.31
0.00
0.00
0.40
0.08

Log Likelihood
Number obs.
Pseudo R square

-11,980.1
28,911
0.1634

0.31
-0.1*

0.26
0.04

-11,976.4
28,911
0.1636

0.05
-0.05

0.32
0.05

-3,472.3
11,538
0.1019

-3,468.25
11,538
0.103

Note: The macro variables were normalized. Line watch hours are normalized at 1 million
hours, LPRs at 100,000 people, non-immigrant visas at 1 million people, and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at 100 pesos per person.
* is significant at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level, and *** at a 1% level.
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Figure 1
Proportionof the ForeignBorn Population Originatingfrom
Northern Europe and the British Isles (1850 to 1930).
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Campbell J. Gibson and Emily Lennon, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born
Population of the United States: 1850-1990 Table 4 (U.S. Bureau of the Census Mar 9,
1999), available at <http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twpsO029/
tab04.html> (last visited Mar 10, 2007).
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Figure 2
Map of States included in the Mexican MigrationProject

Office of Population Research, Mexican Migration Project, available at <http://mmp.opr
.princeton.edu/databases/dataoverview-en.aspx> (last visited May 11, 2007).
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Figure 3
Simulation of the Change in Macro Conditions in Mexico and the
U.S. on the Number of Migrants and Returnees: 1985 and 1997
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